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Introduction 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, 
and hence the disappearance of a monolithic threat to Western Europe, there has been an 
increasing desire to reduce defence spending and divert scarce resources into other public 
sector services. This increased pressure on the defence budgets, which has been felt in 
most countries in Europe and North America, has led to a search for ways of making a 
shrinking budget stretch further. 
 
In some ways the MoD is facing the same challenges as many commercial companies did 
in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s with the recession, in their bid to reduce costs in order 
to maintain profitability. While the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) has generated new 
initiatives such as ‘Smart Procurement’ and ‘Lean Logistics’ in order (for some, at the 
behest of the Treasury) to reduce costs in the procurement and sustainment of the UK 
Armed Forces. This however, can be seen as important due to the fact that defence 
inflation has for many years exceeded normal economic inflation (1), leading to the 
spiraling cost of new weapon systems. 
 
With logistics having become more important as the 20th Century has progressed, and 
particularly since the end of the Cold War, the need for more efficient and effective 
logistics is becoming paramount, as it is seen as both a ‘competitive advantage’ and a 
‘force enabler’. ‘Focused Logistics’ is the latest term to enter usage, and this paper will 
examine how different it is from what has gone before, and whether it is applicable to 
some of the operational challenges that the armed forces might face in the near future. 
 
What is Focused Logistics? 
 
As the 21st Century dawns, the rate of change in technological progress is, compared to 
earlier times, astonishing. With this change, mankind is potentially facing a revolution in 
information technology, which will be equal to, if not greater than, those of the agrarian 
and industrial revolutions of previous centuries. With this technological change, allied 
with the end of the Cold War and the seeming necessity to be able to intervene effectively 
far away from the home base, attitudes to war are changing along with the approach to 
business. In many ways, the two are converging, as the military try to take on board some 
of the ‘best’ practices of the business and commercial world, as both are faced with 
significant alterations in political and economic structures, the geopolitical balance, 
technological progress and perceptions of the ‘threat’. 
 
The term ‘Focused Logistics’ originates with the US Armed Forces and is defined as “the 
fusion of information, logistics and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis 
response, to track and shift assets even while en route, and to deliver tailored logistics 
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packages and sustainment at the strategic, operational and tactical level of operations.” 
(2) The key elements here are the embracing of emerging technologies (particularly 
information technology), transportation techniques, business methods of asset control and 
the concept of ‘tailoring’. (3) 
 
Evolution or Revolution? 
 
Is ‘Focused Logistics’ a new concept or an evolution from present ideas? Is it a military 
version of ‘Lean Logistics’? ‘Lean Logistics’ has five principles: specify value, identify 
its stream and make it flow, pull just in time and strive for perfection. (4) Additionally, 
the objective of integrating information, logistic and distribution systems is also known 
as ‘supply chain logistics’. This includes “the functions of purchasing, transportation, 
inventory control, materials handling, manufacturing, distribution and related systems 
…. Its primary focus is the physical flows and storage of materials and the system flows 
of related information.” (5) It seems that ‘Focused Logistics’ is very similar to ‘Lean 
Logistics’ in many ways, but it can be argued that it is not exactly the same. Where they 
differ is the intention to adopt the principles of ‘Lean Logistics’ to the military 
environment. The military have a requirement for their supply chain to be as flexible as 
possible given the uncertain environment they now face. In essence, they are seeking a 
leaner supply chain, which can support forces anywhere in the world, at short notice. 
 
However, given that the overriding imperative seems to be that of reducing costs, the 
need to have a more efficient supply chain must be seen in that light. Ultimately, if 
revisions in the supply chain are going to be costly, then despite the military benefit, 
governments are unlikely to give the go ahead as the objective for them is the reduction 
of defence spending. Even if the go ahead is given, is ‘Focused Logistics’ achievable? Is 
it possible to utilise a leaner, more responsive supply chain tailored for the operational 
environment (whatever that may be)? 
 
The Lean Supply Chain 
 
‘Focused Logistics’ seeks to reduce the logistic footprint, that is, to reduce the amount of 
equipment and consumables that the MoD needs to store and that commanders need to 
take on operations. This could be undertaken either by better predicting the rate at which 
resources are used, which would enable the defence industry to better gear their rate of 
production within the supply chain to match the usage of the ‘customer’. Therefore, the 
current philosophy of ‘just in case’ (where equipment and supplies are stockpiled to 
cover as many eventualities as possible) would have to be replaced by a ‘just in time’ 
one’. (6) However, it may be that commercial JIT is too risky in an operational 
environment, and that the MoD will move towards a compromise position of ‘just 
enough’, which should reduce inventory and make the supply chain more efficient. 
 
The second method would be to build a greater level of reliability into systems in order to 
reduce the maintenance burden. By reducing the amount of maintenance needed, it 
logically follows that the amount of spare parts that have to be moved through the supply 
chain can thus be reduced. Correspondingly, the number of faulty parts moving back up 
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the chain is reduced as well. As an example, during the Gulf War, the Challenger 1 main 
battle tank was found initially to have a poor Mean Time Before Failure rate, around 723 
kilometers, instead of the planning figure of 1,235 kilometres. (7) Thus as the Challenger 
was substantially less reliable than anticipated, then far more spares had to be moved 
down the supply chain, more man hours of work had to be put in to fix the problems and 
more faulty parts had to move back up the supply chain. 
 
In reducing the amount of inventory held in the combat area, reducing the throughput in 
the supply chain, and having a greater visibility in the supply chain, it would be possible 
to reduce the logistics infrastructure. Less inventory requires less people to maintain it 
and less space to store it, as well as fewer troops to guard it in the theatre of operations. 
Fewer consumables will mean less personnel and transport assets will be needed to move 
these items (which in turn will mean fewer consumables will be required to keep those 
assets running) but it is important that the right material be loaded on the correct transport 
at the correct time and place. The concept of tailoring resources is an important one and 
will be vital if a leaner supply chain is to be set up. 
 
Focused Logistics: The Advantages 
 
The setting up of a ‘Focused Logistics’ system could have several advantages: 
 
• The availability of global real-time logistic information for all those who need it (as 
in the United States discount chain ‘Wal-Mart’ model). Automatic Identification 
Technology (bar codes, optical memory cards, radio frequency tags etc.) will enhance 
world-wide asset tracking. 
 
• Electronic commerce systems would allow on-line ordering and payment. 
 
• Logistics will be centered around speed, instead of mass, relying on rapid 
transportation systems on both land and sea, as well as in the air. 
 
• Integrated distribution systems (supply chain integration) should improve response 
times, accurate delivery scheduling and forward delivery. 
 
• The enhancement of civil-military integration should mean that the military capitalise 
on best business practice. Commercial lift can be used and brought onto the 
battlefield as a part of the force, as happened in the Gulf War. The contracting of 
civilian firms to provide a broad range of logistic services can be viewed as a 
potential force multiplier, especially in peacekeeping or humanitarian situations in 
countries that have little infrastructure. 
 
• The accurate identification of future logistic requirements should allow industrial 
base planning, allow the MoD to target investment in critical material which in times 
of war the supply of which is too uncertain or lead times too great. 
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• Logistic supply planning tools would allow real-time awareness of unit and weapon 
system readiness, enabling the logistician to be ‘proactive’ and using a ‘pull’ supply 
chain. The redesign of unit organisation should allow it to have a smaller logistics 
‘footprint’ and act as a broker of information and integrator of supplies and services. 
 
• Personnel should receive additional training in the use of IT and acquisition. 
 
• It would enhance overall acquisition reform, such as the move to the paperless 
contracting procedure, electronic commerce, the growth of civil-military integration 
and the use of life-cycle management. 
 
Overall, ‘Focused Logistics’ is designed to reduce response times and costs, produce a 
more agile infrastructure, and improve quality and readiness. This ‘faster, better and best 
value’ support is arrived at by first identifying and then concentrating on the key 
elements of the logistic system, and substitutes speed of response for large ‘just in case’ 
inventories. The real question is whether ‘Focused Logistics’ can actually be made to 
work in an operational environment, or whether it is merely a buzzword for an 
inappropriate business philosophy shoehorned into a military context? There is a danger 
of being seduced by the theory of cost saving and efficiency building – implementing 
‘Focused Logistics’ and then cutting overall logistic capability (or in classic British 
Government parlance, ‘improving the tooth-to-tail ratio’). The Falklands Campaign 
reminded the MoD that the “need to get the logistics right determined the ability of a 
formation to conduct its operations”. (8) The Gulf War could have been a good 
opportunity to test many of the concepts now grouped under the banner of ‘Focused 
Logistics’ but the Coalition instead chose to build up a logistic ‘insurance policy’. Why 
was this apparent lack of trust exhibited when the crunch came? 
 
Focused Logistics: The Disadvantages 
 
The difficulty for the Armed Forces is knowing what they want and need as well as 
finding out what is ‘just enough’ in order to accomplish the goals set them. Allied to this 
are the possible disadvantages with ‘Focused Logistics’: 
 
• A possible over reliance on technology, where “a soldier who is a true information 
warrior may be so fascinated by what he is seeing … on his laptop, that he fails to 
notice that his virtual battlespace is about to be violated by a real warrior with a 
machete who has crept up behind him.” (9) 
 
• The immense power of emerging technology (which continues to advance at a rapid 
rate) has created its own myths, and produced a myopia in which technology and 
automation is the panacea for all situations. As the US Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defense (Logistics) has said, “information and technological advances will 
revolutionise warfare.” (10) There is very little in the concept of ‘Focused Logistics’ 
that does make imaginary use of such advances. 
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• While many factors in the post Cold War world have created a drive for new ideas 
(low threat perception and financial pressure among them) we should not “make the 
mistake of equating reception of concept and volume of debating noise with strategic 
truth.” (11) Purely basing a paradigm shift on upcoming technology (and hence 
changing the fundamental structure of our armed forces) without any true regard or 
appraisal as to the nature of future opponents has its own dangers. Even if we make 
our logistics cleverer, we have not altered the conditions in which they will be tested. 
Technology has many advantages, but in many areas in the world “the ultimate 
determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun.” (12) 
 
• Future warfare is increasingly seen as being dominated by coalition or international 
co-operation. “We take it as a ‘given’  that the future battlespace will be joint … and 
… multinational.” (13) True integration between nations will be very difficult given 
the disparity between budgets and the size of armed forces. 
 
• Not only is there disparity between frontline forces, but also in strategic lift. The UK 
has just over sixty Hercules transports and a few surface ships. The USA used some 
350 transport aircraft in the Gulf War. (14) It is capability differences such as these 
that raise questions about full integration. Asset tracking depends on an uninterrupted 
stream and a capability mismatch anywhere along the line, could prove dangerous. 
(15) 
 
• Modern deep battle doctrine stresses the need to strike at the enemy’s rear areas, 
where he is vulnerable and his supply system is located. If we are fighting a 
reasonable competent and technologically sophisticated opponent (given that we are 
conducting deep battle) then we can assume that he will be looking to do the same to 
us, that is, dislocate our fighting forces from our supply line. ‘Focused Logistics’ has 
not addressed the issue of its own vulnerability to enemy action. Even an asymmetric 
opponent will be out to try and make sure that ‘just in time’ become ‘just too late’. 
 
• Transportation is another central tenet of ‘Focused Logistics’. Many of the current 
transport methods use sophisticated technology and are thus open to exploitation. The 
balance between ‘just in time’ and ‘just in case’ as indicated by Paul Kaminski seems 
to rely heavily on delivery rather than storage. It requires “the substitution of fast 
transportation for logistics infrastructure” (16), which focuses on actual customer 
requirements when those requirements arise. Transportation assets are vulnerable, not 
only to a sophisticated opponent employing deep battle, but also to a well-placed 
insurgent. Ships, planes, trucks and trains however mobile, are soft targets while 
supplies carried with the forces are protected inside their own battlespace. 
 
• There are risks in becoming too dependent on corporate outsourcing in that the 
military may cease to be an ‘intelligent customer’. (17) 
 
• Is one of the true drivers behind ‘Focused Logistics’ that of cost? While cost and 
value have a legitimate place in all defence policy calculations, it is dangerous to 
dress them up as military advantages. “Cost was the ever present limitation. Before 
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Hitler came to power, there seemed very little prospect of the British Army being 
called upon to fight a (European) land battle. Theorists spoke of the ‘expanding 
torrent’ in which armoured forces, with close air support, would make deep 
penetrations through fortified fronts. Such expensive ideas were far too Napoleonic 
for an army mainly concerned with putting down riots in the colonies.” (18) 
 
• If ‘tailoring’ is a cost cutting exercise then it should be acknowledged as such and 
adapted to. Cutting the cloth to produce a more elegant fit is valid, stretching it until 
the seams go, is not. User confidence in ‘Focused Logistics’ will be essential, and 
cost-cutting is a great disincentive to the acceptance of innovation, particularly if it is 
dressed up to be something it is not.  
 
The Tailored Supply Chain – ‘Suits You, Sir?’ 
 
Whatever happens in the way of moving the supply chain towards a more ‘just in time’ 
approach, the MoD must match the logistic capability with its warfighting capability. 
This is actually pretty diverse with high intensity conventional warfare at one extreme 
and peacetime training at the other, with many other types of conflict in-between. The 
logistic requirements of these two scenarios are quite different, and for the UK’s Armed 
Forces to be an effective tool in Foreign and Defence policy, it may seem that the best 
solution would be to have a system that could cope with the worst case scenario – a 
conventional war. But that may incur additional costs in peacetime with significant 
capability going unused. 
 
It would thus appear that the concept of ‘Focused Logistics’, advocating as it does the 
tailoring of the supply chain to the operational need, provides the answer. In peacetime, 
the assets and resources that the military need will be quite small. But as they begin to 
move along the spectrum of conflict, more assets and resources could be allocated to 
meet the increasing requirement. This however, may not only have implications for the 
production capacity within the supply chain, but for the relationships between customers 
and suppliers. 
 
Firstly, there will be implications for the supply of material to formations on the ground 
that are at the end of the supply chain. Because of the rising costs of running and 
maintaining equipment coupled with the high costs of certain consumables (such as 
ammunition, missiles and torpedoes), there is a move towards a greater reliance on 
simulation to cover the needs of peacetime training. If this is combined with the concepts 
of lean supply management, that is, keeping the minimal amount of inventory and 
producing goods as and when required, it is possible that the production of such goods 
will be small or even zero in peacetime, with the intention to gear up or even restart 
production if necessary. The problem however, is that commercial organisations are 
unlikely to want, or be able to leave production capacity unutilised whilst awaiting MoD 
requirements. Chances are, they will want to employ these resources satisfying other 
customers, and are unlikely to divert these resources back to the MoD if it adversely 
affects other commercial relationships. In order to guarantee supply, it might have to 
purchase production capacity that lays dormant, and that could be expensive. 
 7
 
 Secondly, financial pressure may mean the increased outsourcing of certain services, 
such as the maintenance of equipment, to a greater extent than happens now. This may 
also become more commonplace as systems become more complicated and the MoD has 
to rely on the system’s producers to maintain their product in service. While in a 
peacetime role, this may not present a problem, but the MoD has to prepare to engage in, 
if need be, other operational deployments, up to, and including, high intensity 
conventional warfare. How the MoD satisfies this need, either by having civilian 
contractors or sponsored reserves is not the question. What matters is that the operational 
commander can be guaranteed their participation, particularly where it is a foreign 
company, whose government does not support the actions of the UK. Of course, the same 
problems could reoccur with regard to the tailoring of the transportation needs of the 
supply chain. Transport assets need to be earmarked and contracts placed, to acquire the 
necessary resources as the MoD’s needs expand and contract according to the situation. 
This principle isn’t new, but SDR identified a number of flaws in the system, as did the 
National Audit Office report regarding the contractoring of sealift for Operation Granby. 
(19) These flaws would have an impact on one of the central tenets of ‘Focussed 
Logistics’ – that of rapid response. 
 
Flexibility and Responsiveness 
 
In times past, there was an assumption in the MoD that transport assets could be obtained 
from commercial sources if the need was sufficiently great. In SDR, the MoD announced 
its intention to purchase four more roll-on/roll-off ships and four large strategic lift 
aircraft (C-17 or equivalent) (20) in recognition that while resources such as these may be 
obtainable given sufficient lead time, the time frames that the MoD may sometimes have 
to deal with makes it unlikely that commercial resources would be available. This is 
another possible Achilles heel with ‘Focussed Logistics’. 
 
Of the few definitions that exist of ‘Focused Logistics’ none defines rapid response in 
terms of time frame. The British Army holds combat units at varying states of readiness, 
some as little as twenty-four hours. As a bench mark, however, it anticipates being able to 
deploy a fully operational brigade in thirty days. Any logistic support for this formation 
must therefore be able to respond in the same timescale. It is unlikely then, that in a 
normal situation, that civilian production facilities, support assets and transport assets 
will be available at such short notice unless they remain uncommitted to other ventures 
and earmarked solely for MoD use, which in all probability will command a premium 
price. It may therefore be more cost effective in certain situations to rely on military 
assets rather than civilian ones. If the operation then becomes a prolonged one, there is 
thus no reason why commercial assets could be used in the longer term, thus releasing 
military assets to once again be held for short notice contingencies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The United States Armed Forces see ‘Focused Logistics’ once fully implemented, as a 
seamless system where there is total asset visibility to enable logistics to be based on 
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velocity of distribution rather than stockholding. Rapid force projection will be possible 
thanks to an adequate but small logistic footprint and an ‘agile supply chain’. (21) The 
use of commercial best practice, competitive sourcing and partnering, combined with a 
decreased in-theatre logistic footprint and infrastructure, reduced inventory and reduced 
numbers of maintenance personnel are all part of the strategy. It will reduce costs, 
increase flexibility and provide them with the tailored support to take on an enemy 
anywhere in the world at short notice. It thus seems an answer to budgetary prayers. For 
those who resent paying for warfighting assets that remain under utilised in peacetime, 
‘Focused Logistics’ advocates lean supply and a flexible supply chain that should enable 
the ‘tailoring’ of logistic requirements on a case by case basis. Not only would it remove 
the financial drain of under utilised assets, but a properly constructed and tested 
‘Focused’ supply chain should ensure the right warfighting assets are in the right place at 
the right time and in the right amount. 
 
The MoD has not stated that they will adopt ‘Focussed Logistics’ as such, and will have 
to implement a number of changes before they will have the capability to support such a 
system. The United States has the advantages of having the required funding, economies 
of scale and readiness to innovate that means that they have every chance of pulling this 
off. 
 
While some operations (such as in the former Yugoslavia) have shown ‘Focused 
Logistics’ to work, it would be inappropriate to draw the conclusion that it can therefore 
work in all scenarios. In large scale conventional operations, the dependence on 
technology and logistics based on velocity of distribution, may leave the forces involved 
vulnerable to whether there is enough transport assets available to accomplish the 
mission, unanticipated weather, capability mismatches with other allies, maintenance 
problems, enemy interdiction and the ‘fog’ or ‘friction’ of war. ‘Tailoring’ needs to 
provide the best, and not just the cheapest, if the troops on the ground are going to have 
confidence in the system. The final shape of the supply chain, whether it is closer to ‘just 
in case’ or ‘just in time’, must be constructed and tested under the concept of kaizen or 
the eternal drive for perfection. The system must be constantly tested under conditions as 
close as possible to what will be found under operational deployment. As such, logistics 
planning must take into account the huge variety of scenarios that are possible in the 
post-Cold War world. In the commercial world, the supply chain that works for cars may 
not work for computers or fresh food, just as high intensity conventional conflict is far 
removed from many of the operations other than war that we have seen in the past few 
years. While the exploitation of technology for military advantage has always been an 
important part of the race to win wars, it should not be sought in isolation. Just as 
important is an understanding of its best use, the risks, how it can change or not change 
the operational environment, and how an enemy might respond to its use. 
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